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The purpose of this article is to describe the place of legal expertise 
in the operation of hospital ethics committees and to suggest a substantive 
role for committee members in the construction of the legal context of 
medical decisionmaking. 
For most of the last fifteen years, the authors have served together on 
the Ethical Services Committee at The Queen's Medical Center (QMC) in 
Honolulu, the largest private hospital in Hawaii. One of us (ICK) is a 
philosopher - a specialist in ethics (including medical ethics), philosophy of 
law, and social philosophy. The other (JP) teaches healthcare law at the 
University's Law School and supervises law students in a legal clinic serving 
the elderly . Years ago, we both assisted in setting up the Ethical Services 
Committee and, for a period, one of us served as its chair. Although most of 
the committee's membership consists of people who primarily work for or 
within that institution, the two of us are outsiders, employed as professors at 
the University of Hawaii at Manoa, a few miles away. 
Ethics committee meetings are held on the first Tuesday of each 
month and members' terms rotate over once-renewable six-year periods. The 
long tenure ensures a robust institutional memory. Four or five of the 
committee's members also serve as on-the-floor ethics consultants, having 
received specialized training for that purpose. They all have regular positions 
within the hospital, and taking turns on a monthly basis, they carry the 
committee's designated pager and report on their consults at the monthly 
committee meeting. The reports of these monthly consultations are the 
central feature of the meetings and they generally provoke extensive 
discussion. This system serves to give the on-the-floor consultants the benefit 
of the committee's feedback and - equally important - it assures that the 
other members of the committee are regularly alerted to ethical issues arising 
in the hospital. The ethics consultants also have the authority to call 
emergency case reviews as needed, summoning the entire committee within 
hours. Without question, this system has served to generate for the committee 
a strong sense of ownership regarding the standards that have emerged over 
the years. 
The Queen's Committee features a multidisciplinary membership 
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that has regularly included doctors, hospital trustees, administrators, nurses, 
psychiatrists or psychologists, social workers, patient-relations staff, clergy, 
risk managers, ethicists, and attorneys. This article is intended to describe the 
integration of our two professional disciplines - ethics and particularly law -
into the workings of the committee. Our focus will be on two issues. First, 
we will explore what the discipline of law can bring to the table. And second, 
we want to describe something like a law/ethics partnership in carrying the 
concerns of the healthcare ethics committee (HEC) into the community. 
The law now plays an increasingly large role in the organization and 
delivery of healthcare services and both court cases and legislation have, to 
an extent, framed discussion in ethics. Accordingly, the interpretation of 
court cases and legislation is an obvious service that attorneys can provide. 
Nonetheless, there have historically been two well-rehearsed concerns about 
the presence of attorneys on HECs. 
In the first place, some have worried that, when they work for the 
institution, lawyers may conceive themselves and act as advocates for the 
hospital, protecting its interests as paramount, even at the expense of others. 
(Indeed, the protection of a client's interests is normally the lawyer's 
distinctive function.) This perspective can be worse than unhelpful when the 
task at hand is to figure out how to honor the interests of a patient. For 
example, though a patient may have rationally decided against aggressive 
care before deteriorating, terminally ill patients are often unable to sue even 
though relatives retain that ability. Accordingly, when spouses and siblings 
rattle the legal sword while protesting withdrawal of life-support as the 
patient wished, there can be an obvious conflict between how best to honor 
the institution's obligations to the patient and how best to protect the hospital 
against potentially damaging litigation. 
One approach to this risk would be to select attorneys who do not 
work for the hospital and, even better, who do not work primarily as 
advocates for clients. Retired judges, who have been around the block and 
are used to weighing arguments, can be ideal. But law professors also offer a 
solution, particularly those specializing in elder- and health-related law. 
Legal scholars live in a world quite different from the one occupied by 
practicing attorneys, and their capabilities can be particularly useful to HECs; 
particularly their research skills, their contacts with colleagues both locally 
and elsewhere in the world, and their knowledgeability about legislative and 
judicial activities and trends. Elder law can be especially pertinent in case 
reviews since many of the issues the QMC Committee considers involve end-
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of-life questions. The needs of the elderly are many and diverse, and to meet 
the goals and needs of the older client, these specialized attorneys work with 
a variety of tools and techniques and with a host of allies, including 
healthcare professionals, social workers, finance and tax consultants, and 
family caregivers. Just as specialists in medical ethics can enrich a 
committee's discourse by drawing upon the arguments advanced and 
criticized in the relevant literature, so experience with elder law's holistic 
approach can contribute to the quality of an HEC's judgment. There is no 
conflict between the patient-centered focus of the hospital and the distinctive 
professional concerns of the academic specialist in elder-law. 
The second set of concerns about the presence of lawyers on HECs 
arises out of a worry that the committees will lose their distinctive focus 
exactly to the extent that dialogue about what the law does and does not 
permit comes to replace debate about ethically appropriate courses of action. 
This is especially likely to occur when HEC members broadly accept that [1] 
ethical obligations are trumped by background legal obligations and [2] a 
lawyer's prediction or conjecture about what the courts might do, itself has 
the force oflaw. 
Two responses can address this concern. First, the worry rests upon 
inaccurate views of, first, the lawyer's distinctive competencies and, second, 
their value to the committee's work. While attorneys certainly need to 
"know" the law, that knowledge does not exhaust the attorney's expertise. 
Much more important are a wide range of abilities essential in legal practice 
and scholarship: the abilities to spot issues, to generate alternative solutions 
and strategies, to plan and implement inquiry, to sense when fact-gathering 
has been completed, to organize and present information in a coherent form, 
to work effectively with difficult people and Byzantine organizations, to 
present complicated ideas in accessible ways, and to generate viable formulas 
for mediation between principled disagreement. In practice, very little of an 
attorney's participation on an HEC need involve solemn pronouncements on 
the law's requirement; even here the truth is that both the verdicts of juries 
and the opinions of judges are notoriously difficult to predict. 
The second response is to challenge the idea that ethical obligations 
always trump legal ones. In journalism, for example, when a judge orders a 
reporter to reveal the identity of a confidential source, the journalist is under 
a clear legal obligation to reveal that source (1). Ethically, however, the 
reporter is under an equally clear professional obligation of confidentiality, 
an obligation NOT to reveal the source. If one makes the all-too-common 
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mistake of supposing that legal obligations trump ethical obligations, one 
will be tragically unable to appreciate those circumstances where the two 
conflict. 
Now the point here is not that ethical obligations trump legal ones 
but, rather, that there is an element of Greek tragedy when conscientious 
practitioners have to choose between being responsible professionals and 
being law abiding citizens. To their credit and misfortune, many journalists 
go to jail rather than betray their professional obligations. 
It is useful to think of law and ethics as autonomous: there is, at 
bottom, no reason to suppose a priori that the two will always be consistent 
with each other. Our legal system is an all-too-human artifact; it can be 
crafted with wisdom or pasted together in haste. It is said that people should 
not observe sausage being made; the same may be true oflaw. 
But the details of this conundrum, in fact, point toward a creative 
solution. For if professionals can somehow come to reasoned agreement 
about the ethical obligations applicable in healthcare (apart from their legal 
duties), they may then be able to participate in the legislative and judicial 
processes, striving to insure that the law will not prohibit conscientious 
professionals from doing what they are ethically obligated to do. Hawaii is a 
small state with a small population and, unlike the other 49, our nearest 
neighbor is thousands of miles away. Thrown upon our own resources, it 
becomes possible to participate as an honest broker in the judicial and 
legislative processes. We do not question that the law can reach into the 
deliberations of ethics committees. Surely it sometimes does. However, it can 
also happen that the ethical judgments that have come to prevail in HECs can 
reach into the legislative and judicial processes. 
It is relevant that the two of us have done work in many different 
local settings. We have trained and taught hundreds of professionals in law, 
medicine and other fields, represented clients, served as Guardian Ad Litem 
(GAL), testified before the legislature, provided expert witness services in 
the courts, participated in the drafting of legislation, worked with state 
agencies and served on statewide health-related advisory commissions. Our 
experience on HECs has informed all of this extra-mural work and, in 
consequence, our stamps may be faintly observable in some areas of Hawaii 
law. Experience on HECs makes it possible to playa role in crafting the legal 
context within which healthcare professional's function. 
The case of Shirley Crabtree, Hawaii's first "right to die" case, is an 
illuminating example of such work. Some years ago, a Honolulu attorney 
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sought the court's pennission to withdraw life-supportive treatment from his 
mother. Following a severe fall, Mrs. Crabtree had suffered multiple 
fractures, a closed-head injury, and cerebral contusions. Fifty-nine years old, 
the accident left her severely brain damaged, unable to speak or participate 
reliably in discussions of medical treatment. (There was some evidence that 
she may have occasionally been able to communicate through eye-blinks.) 
Nourishment was being provided by a nasogastric feeding tube. When she 
was told that removal of the feeding tube would cause death, and questions 
were put to her concerning discontinuation of treatment, her responses were 
either inconclusive or affirmed a decision to terminate nutrition and 
hydration. She never registered an objection to the idea of discontinuing 
treatment. 
Though opinions differed to some degree about the nature of her 
neurological condition, it was uncontested that her brain injury was 
pennanent and that she was unable to manage her personal needs in any way. 
She had continued to deteriorate despite the care she had been receiving. 
Uncontradicted testimony from friends and family revealed that, prior to her 
accident, Shirley Crabtree had said that if she ever became totally and 
permanently disabled, she would not want to be kept alive. There was no 
hving will, the statute recognizing advance directives went into effect only 
after her accident, and Cruzan (2) had not yet been decided. 
Prior to the hearing the judge appointed one of the authors (JP) as 
Shirley Crabtree's GAL to protect her interests in matters pending before the 
court. In addition to reviewing the medical record and spending time with 
Mrs. Crabtree, he communicated with the guardian, other family members, 
friends, the healthcare providers, expert witnesses, and Hawaii Adult 
Protective Services. He reviewed a broad array of documents pertinent to the 
case and provided reports to the court which reviewed the background, 
summarized the interviews and documents, and clarified many of the legal 
issues presented. These touched on standards of practice in the medical 
community, constitutional rights to privacy, infonned consent, substituted or 
reconstructed judgments on behalf of incapacitated patients, withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration, refusals of life-sustaining treatment, and the judicial 
power of a court to order its discontinuation, pertinent statutes, and suicide. 
At the same time, Mrs. Crabtree's son had retained the other author 
(KK) and a second ethicist as expert witnesses on medical ethics. The two 
visited Mrs. Crabtree and, as expert witnesses, described current thinking on 
a range of ethical issues. Four points were made: 
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decisionally capacitated adult patients should be 
respected in their right to withhold and withdraw 
consent to life-prolonging medical treatment; 
notwithstanding the differing experiences of the two, 
there is no pertinent ethical difference between the 
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment and the 
withholding of life-prolonging treatment; 
there is no pertinent ethical difference between the 
withdrawal of artificially administered nutrition and 
hydration and the withdrawal of other forms of life-
prolonging medical treatment; and 
fonnerly capacitated adult patients should have 
medical decisions made in accordance with their 
previously expressed wishes, values, goals, projects 
and beliefs as these may be discerned in documents 
prepared by the patient (advance directives) and/or 
in recollected conversations with the patient 
(substituted judgment). 
Substantiation of these points took two forms: first, there 
was evidence of the emergence of consensus in the professional 
literature; and, second, it appeared that the reasoning supporting the 
consensus was sound. To be sure, there was a need to be forthcoming 
and candid about outlier scholars and practitioners who, at the time, 
still questioned some of these precepts or differed substantively in 
minor ways. And, acknowledging the lack of professional consensus 
at the level of ethical theory, it had to be acknowledged that there 
were variations in the ways scholars reached what were similar 
conclusions. Even so, it would have been no heroic feat for any 
competent bioethicist to explain why it was reasonable to accept the 
consensus view, all things considered. 
The circuit court hearing was held in April 1990. Judge Daniel G. 
Heely found that Shirley Crabtree's nasogastric feeding tube was a medical 
treatment or medical procedure which merely kept her alive when treatment 
was futile: that it did not provide her comfort or pain relief; that it was 
contrary to her own previously stated beliefs and desires; that it was contrary 
to the decisions of her family and guardian in consultation with her attending 
physician; and that she had an independent constitutional right to privacy 
under Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution which included the 
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right of a person (or a guardian for an incompetent person), to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment, including an artificial feeding tube, if done 
consistently with proper medical standards, and that this constitutional right 
to privacy prevailed over any conflicting statutory provision. Judge Heely 
ordered "that if the attending physician for Shirley Crabtree and her guardian 
agree that it is proper to withdraw the nasogastric feeding tube, then the 
specific recommendations of the GAL in this case be followed." The feeding 
tube was removed. On May 8, 1990, Shirley Crabtree died at age 64, a month 
before the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in the Cruzan case (3). 
The use of a court-appointed GAL to gather and marshal evidence 
calls attention to certain non-adversarial aspects of the Family Court. 
Inquisitorial systems, such as those in use in Latin America and Europe rely 
less on contending attorneys and more on investigating magistrates working 
directly for the judge, much as the GAL did here. At one point, the judge 
suggested that the courts should not be used as the preferred forum to make 
such decisions, but that these were best left to ethics committees which, with 
their multi-disciplinary membership can provide guidance to physicians and 
families. Judge Heely added that, in effect, the court proceeding was much 
like a large HEC, receiving information from many perspectives and 
backgrounds. We would note that this HEC had a strong chair. 
The Crabtree case effected a significant change in the way deaths 
occurred in Hawaii. It altered hospital practices and strengthened the 
integrity of the ethics consultation process. But for some lawyers and 
philosophers on HECs, it points in the direction of a markedly expanded role. 
At the deepest level, the "client" for the work we do is not the patient, not the 
hospital nor its staff, but, rather, the community and its "representative" 
patient. As required, we can be an advocate for that set of interests. To be 
sure, issues can often be resolved in-house. But at times umesolvable 
problems can require corrective measures outside of the hospital. We don't 
wish to suggest that our strategy has been a great success in Hawaii. There 
are still too many healthcare professionals who appear untouched by the 30-
year ethics conversation, too many patients whose advance directives are 
ignored, and too many ill-considered laws that make things worse for 
patients, doctors and hospitals. But over time, one can learn to participate in 
the legislative and judicial processes, to write op ed pieces that can be 
appreciated by general audiences, to give public lectures that call attention to 
pressing problems, to develop relationships with state agencies and citizen 
organizations, to teach the next generation of doctors and lawyers and, 
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broadly, to become involved in politics - statecraft - in the best Aristotelian 
sense. 
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